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A B S T R A C T
Occupations have long been held by sociologists, from the older status attainment tradition to the more recent micro-class tradition, to be at the center of strati-
fication writ large. Occupations are specifically argued to be central to shaping wages. Indeed, this has been understood as the comparative advantage of sociology
relative to economics in understanding wage setting. However, an undercurrent has for decades existed in sociology that suggests other contexts, mainly workplaces
and jobs, may be as important if not more important stratification contexts. Until recently data with the capacity to simultaneously assess all three contexts has been
virtually non-existent. In this paper we use administrative data from five countries (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, and South Korea) to assess the relative
contributions of occupations, establishments, and jobs to wages. Our core finding is that there is no universal link between occupations and wages, with occupations
explaining between 30 and 56 % of wage variance across country-years. As well, in all countries except Finland establishments explain more of the variance in wages
than do occupations. Jobs and establishment figure prominently in the social organization of wages, and must be included in theoretical models and whenever
possible in empirical analyses of social stratification.
1. Introduction
Sociologists have variously identified classes, occupations, jobs, and
organizations as plausible contexts in which to study labor market
stratification (e.g. Baron & Bielby, 1980; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992;
Tomaskovic-Devey, 1995; Weeden & Grusky, 2005; Wright, 1997). The
original status attainment model used occupation as a structural des-
tination in mobility dynamics (Blau & Duncan, 1967). At that time only
occupational data were routinely available as indicators of stratification
positions. Later, occupations were easily tied to class schemas and be-
came the indicators of “big classes” in more general social theory (e.g.
Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992). This has generated a recent debate in
sociology on the appropriate level of class analysis, pitting the micro-
classes of Weeden and Grusky (2005) against the long standing big class
schemas of the Marxian and Weberian traditions (e.g. Erikson &
Goldthorpe, 1992; Goldthorpe, 2000; Wright, 1997).
However, much less attention has been given to the influence of
occupations in relation to organizations and jobs in structuring wages
and other socio-economic rewards. Thus, there is little clarity over the
relative contributions of occupations, organizations, and jobs in gen-
erating individual identities, collective action, and distributional in-
equalities. Increasingly, however, social scientists have access to high
quality administrative data with precise information on the establish-
ments and even jobs people work in, allowing a more expansive in-
vestigation into the structure of stratification. With such data it is now
possible to interrogate the role of workplaces and jobs, in addition to
occupation, in producing life chances. Using high quality adminis-
trative data we focus on the relative empirical impact of occupation,
establishment, and jobs on distributional earnings inequalities in mul-
tiple countries over the recent quarter century.
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T
Examining the relative roles of occupations, organizations, and jobs
is important for multiple reasons. First, sociologists have consistently
identified large residual wage variance within even quite detailed oc-
cupations, but have to date left them largely unexplored empirically.
Second, the theoretical basis of occupation as a site of stratification is
arguably weaker than the actual relational sites of production (orga-
nizations) and distribution (jobs). Occupation has, however, been the
only consistently available indicator of stratification position and so has
long served as the default operationalization. Finally, occupational
analyses have been largely superseded in the public square by econo-
mist’s focus on workplace (e.g. Card, Cardoso, Heining, & Kline, 2018)
and earnings (Sakamoto & Wang, 2019) stratification. If the socio-
logical focus on stratification is to reclaim relevance it will do well to
demonstrate its relevance for the explanation of earnings inequalities.
In this paper we assess the degree to which the stratification
structure is empirically well represented through occupations across
countries and over time, while also comparing occupation to work-
places and jobs. Unlike studies that focus on a single firm or a few
geographically clustered firms, we use nationally representative ad-
ministrative data to estimate the degree of wage variation associated
with each level of labor market location across two decades and five
national economies. We do not resolve the theoretical debate con-
cerning whether stratification is more fundamentally linked to work-
places, jobs, or occupations, but do demonstrate empirically that both
workplaces and especially jobs are more fundamental in almost all
country-years examined.
2. Conceptualizing occupations, organizations, and jobs
For sociologists occupations have long been treated as the funda-
mental stratification position, conditioning individual life chances and
transmitting class advantages. In generating inequalities occupations
can be conceptualized as having two dimensions. First, they represent
collections of similar tasks requiring similar skill-sets (le Grand &
Tåhlin, 2013; Liu & Grusky, 2013; Tåhlin, 2007; Williams & Bol, 2018).
On this dimension occupations are the set of technical positions in the
overall division of labor. But there is a second dimension, in which
occupations are status groupings infused with shared social valuations
(Freeland & Hoey, 2018; Treiman, 1977). On this dimension incum-
bents of some occupations are seen as more valuable, powerful, and
important, grafting a prestige order onto the occupational skill struc-
ture. Via both the skill and status dimensions occupations are under-
stood to generate inequalities in economic outcomes (Freeland & Hoey,
2018; Williams & Bol, 2018).
Weeden and Grusky (2012) (2005) take the skill and status di-
mensions a step further, arguing that these occupational dimensions are
also potentially institutionalized into coherent, relatively organized
social communities. When occupational communities develop their
members see themselves as part of the same social group with shared
identities, as well as engage in occupational closure strategies to limit
labor supply or enhance occupational standing. This line of reasoning
then leads Weeden and Grusky to term detailed occupational categories
“micro-classes” (see also Grusky & Weeden, 2001; Grusky & Sørensen,
1998; Jonsson, Grusky, Di Carlo, Pollak, & Brinton, 2009). As micro-
classes, Weeden and Grusky (2005) demonstrate both that more of the
association between occupations and individual-level outcomes occurs
at the level of dissagregated occupations in contrast to occupations
aggregated into class schema, and that disaggregated occupations ty-
pically do better at predicting those individual outcomes in a causal
model.1
The “occupations as micro-classes” framework suggests that occu-
pations are fairly well- institutionalized socio-economic groupings that
are more or less internally coherent social categories existing in and
generating real social worlds. If occupations are internally coherent and
represent distinctive communities, this implies that individuals within a
given occupation will have roughly similar wages, especially net of
individual characteristics, and that within-occupation wage homo-
geneity should be fairly stable over time and across countries. This does
not imply that occupations will have the same (even inflation-adjusted)
wage scales over time, just that the degree to which occupations pro-
duce particular wage structures will be similar over time and space.
A large body of work provides evidence for this coherence.
Occupations are among the strongest predictors of individual wages,
and predict wages beyond individual traits (England, Budig, & Folbre,
2002; Weeden, 2002). Moreover, between-occupation variance has
widened in at least the US and UK (Mouw & Kalleberg, 2010; Weeden,
Kim, Di Carlo, & Grusky, 2007; Williams, 2012). The view of occupa-
tions as coherent stratification positions is also consistent with the long
history of studies showing remarkable stability in the status ordering of
occupations over time and across countries (le Grand & Tåhlin, 2013;
Nakao & Treas, 1994; Treiman, 1977).
However, while occupations do appear to be empirically important
drivers of wage inequality, there is also a great deal of wage variance
within occupations (Autor & Handel, 2013; Carbonaro, 2005; Kim &
Sakamoto, 2008; Sakamoto & Wang, 2017). In fact, most analyses, from
the initial estimates by Jencks et al. (1972) to more recent analyses of
the growth of between-occupation inequality (e.g. Kim & Sakamoto,
2008; Mouw & Kalleberg, 2010; Weeden et al., 2007; Williams, 2012),
find that there is more variation in earnings within occupations than
between them. Moreover, Sakamoto and Wang (2017) for a sample of
college graduates find that occupational impacts on earnings are small
(relative to organizational and job impacts) and declining. So, even
while occupations are useful explanations of wage inequality that go
beyond individual attributes, within-occupation processes appear po-
tentially more fundamental to the actual levels of inequality.2
Often within-occupation wage inequality is assumed to reflect un-
observed variation at the individual level. For example, Weeden et al.
(2007) treat the occupational and big-class components of wage in-
equality as structural inequality and assume that within-occupation
wage inequality reflects an unstructured inequality gradient connected
to individual-level differences. There is, however, good reason to think
that occupational categories miss important structural aspects of the
stratification process.
Several sociologists have pointed to actual workplaces and the so-
cial relationships within them as a more precise operationalization of
classical theoretical concerns with inequality generating processes
(Baron & Bielby, 1980; Tomaskovic-Devey & Avent-Holt, 2019). In
these views both the production of value and its distribution happen in
workplace divisions of labor. Occupations are to some extent ac-
counting tools that index the importance of skill (e.g. le Grand & Tåhlin,
2013) and perhaps status (e.g. Freeland & Hoey, 2018; Treiman, 1977)
in those distributional processes, but do not embed stratification in the
actual division of labor that produces and distributes value. From this
point of view organizations and jobs are preferred stratification con-
texts for the analyses of inequalities.
1 Treating dissagregated occupations as “micro-classes” may be conceptually
slippery, as classes are generally defined by their relationships to one another
rather than their positioning in an abstract division of labor. When treated in
relational terms, through their authority and ownership dimensions, classes still
(footnote continued)
tend to effect income, life conditions, and political attitudes over and above
disaggregated occupations, in some cases with classes having a stronger effect
than disaggregated occupations (Wodtke, 2017). Weeden and Grusky seem to
share this theoretical concern as they have more recently begun to use the terms
micro-class and detailed occupation interchangeably (e.g. Jonsson et al., 2009;
Weeden & Grusky, 2012).
2 Kim, Tamborini and Sakamoto (2018), focusing on long term earnings as a
proxy for life chances, find that a single year of earnings early in the career is a
better predictor of life chances than even detailed occupation.
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Following Baron and Bielby (1980), a plethora of studies on the role
of workplaces in generating stratification emerged (see reviews in
DiTomaso, Post, & Parks-Yancy, 2007; Reskin & Kmec, 1999; Stainback,
Skaggs, & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2010). From these literatures
Tomaskovic-Devey and Avent-Holt (2019) have argued that inequalities
in both the generation of income and its distribution happen within the
relational space of organizations. Jobs represent the structural locations
in those relational spaces that structure actors’ claims on organizational
income flows. Similarly, Kim and Sakamoto (2008) treat within-occu-
pation wage inequality as driven by organizational processes.
Economists too have for the last twenty years focused on the im-
portance of workplaces in conditioning earnings distributions (e.g.
Abowd & Kramarz, 1999; Lazear Edward & Shaw, 2009). This literature
emerged in response to the availability of linked employer-employee
administrative data, and has documented both substantial workplace
autonomy in wage setting net of human capital characteristics and the
role of workplace productivity in setting wages (Card et al., 2018). In
addition, this literature documents strong ties between rising individual
earnings inequalities and between workplace earnings polarization. The
majority of rising earnings inequalities in the US, Sweden, and Germany
have been linked to the polarization of workplace mean earnings
(Barth, Bryson, Davis, & Freeman, 2016; Card, Heining, & Kline, 2013
Song, Price, Guvenen, & Bloom, 2019;). We have recently documented
this trend toward between workplace wage polarization in twelve of
fourteen countries examined (Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2019). Inter-
estingly, the economist’s interpretation of these trends is strikingly si-
milar to the original status attainment model, although it is education
and skill-based sorting between low and high earnings firms that is the
explanation for rising inequalities. Clearly, even for examining in-
equality trends establishments are an alternative to the occupational
analyses common in sociology.
Jobs, conceptualized as the social locations that organizations pro-
duce by bundling together particular tasks in a typically hierarchical
labor process, are a particularly plausible alternative location to occu-
pation alone in the distribution of earnings. If occupations represent the
bundles of similar tasks requiring similar skill-sets, then jobs are the
actualization of particular tasks requiring particular skills within a
given workplace. “Professor” represents an occupation requiring a PhD
in order to teach and conduct research at a university. But, as a job
some professors are required to teach more than research, some must
pursue grant funding to maintain their income, some have loftier re-
search accounts than others, and some are expected to pursue particular
teaching techniques or publication records. Even more so, jobs come
with defined relationships to concrete other jobs in a workplace, and
how these relationships are defined can vary from cooperative to
competive to abusive even within the same occupation (Hodson, 2001;
Hodson, Roscigno, & Lopez, 2006; Roscigno, Lopez, & Hodson, 2009;
Roscigno, Sauer, & Valet, 2018). Jobs then can be thought of as the
intersection of occupations and class relations, with occupations re-
presenting work tasks and classes representing the organization of the
labor process and its social relations (see also Wright, 1980).
One could push this claim (jobs as the intersection of occupations
and classes) too far, though as a starting point for conceptualizing jobs
this seems reasonable. What is clear is that jobs can vary even when
treated as in the same occupational category. Tomaskovic-Devey (1995)
provides evidence for the U.S. that the empirically powerful processes
are at the job level rather than between occupations. Also for the U.S.,
Petersen and Morgan (1995) demonstrate that the bulk of the gender
wage gap circa 1980 was explained through jobs measured as occu-
pation-establishment pairs rather than either occupations or establish-
ments alone. While tasks are often conceptualized as an attribute of
occupations, and then measured at the occupation-level, when tasks are
measured at the job level we observe non-trivial variation in tasks
within occupations but between jobs (Autor & Handel, 2013;
Tomaskovic-Devey, 1995; Williams & Bol, 2018).
We expect that a significant portion of the processes driving within-
occupation wage inequality are job-level processes within organiza-
tions. We also suspect that establishments, as the location in which
earnings are distributed, are plausible alternatives to occupations in any
analyses of inequality dynamics.
In what follows, we first compare the impact of occupation on
earnings across countries and time. We go on to examine the relative
contribution of occupation, establishment and jobs to earnings varia-
tions. We then examine the degree to which individual, establishment,
and job information helps to explain within-occupation wage variance.
In doing so we are estimating across countries and over time the pro-
portion of wage inequality that can be described through occupational
relative to organizational and job-level processes. We also examine the
Weeden et al. (2007) proposal that the within-occupation variance is
simply a function of individual variation, extending this explanation to
establishments and jobs as well. If the distributional processes are oc-
curring at the job or establishment level, then individual traits should
explain a larger proportion of the residual within establishment and job
variance than they do at the occupational level.
3. National contexts
While occupations, workplaces, and jobs are each plausible candi-
dates for how inequality is organized, it is possible that inequality will
be organized on these dimensions differently across countries. In par-
ticular, the organization of labor market institutions will shape exactly
how inequality gets organized (Bol & Weeden, 2014; Soskice & Hall,
2001), potentially influencing the degree to which occupations, estab-
lishments, and jobs shape inequality outcomes. In the political economy
tradition, union power and centralized wage bargaining have been
pointed to as the key institutional forces impacting earnings distribu-
tions (Rueda & Pontusson, 2000). Previous research in sociology, in
contrast, has stressed the stability of occupational distinctions across
time and space (le Grand & Tåhlin, 2013; Goldthorpe, 2000; Treiman,
1977). Weeden and Grusky (2012; 2005) are more attentive to in-
stitutional processes and recognize that at the level of micro-classes
particular occupational distinctions can be more or less in-
stitutionalized.
We analyze data from Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan and
South Korea, which represent a range of labor market institutions.
There is limited prior research on national institutions and variation in
occupational and establishment stratification. We rely primarily in this
section on comparative political economy theory and research on na-
tional labor markets to extrapolate plausible expectations for country
variation in levels and trends for occupation, establishment, and job
stratification. Because prior empirical literature is so sparse we treat
these expectations as weak predictions at best.
In occupation-centered labor markets, positions and actors’ con-
ceptualization of positions are organized around occupational distinc-
tions. What matters most for an individual’s life chances are the bundle
of skills they possess and the ability to then sell that to any employer on
the labor market. In such labor markets which particular employer one
sells their labor to is less important than what skills they are able to sell
to the employer. Such occupation-centered labor market institutions are
often associated with coordinated market economies and map onto
nationally coordinated wage bargaining.
In firm-centered labor markets, the labor market is organized
through a hierarchy of firms, and what matters most is not what par-
ticular skills you are able to sell to an employer but to which employer
you sell those skills. Firm-centered labor markets are also likely to map
onto coordinated market economies, particularly those with industry-
level wage bargaining and a dual labor market structure.
Job-centered labor markets tend to be associated with liberal
market economies, where wages are primarily set at the individual or
workplace level. Because firms and workers vary in their market power
such economies tend to produce high levels of earnings inequalities at
the individual level. The U.S. is identified as the preeminent example of
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such an economy (Soskice & Hall, 2001). In a job-centered labor market
it not only matters what skills you have to sell to employers, but also
which employers purchase those skills. Prior research, which demon-
strates the empirical superiority of job to occupation analyses, have all
been undertaken in the US, a liberal market economy (Bielby & Baron,
1986; Petersen & Morgan, 1995; Tomaskovic-Devey, 1995). Un-
fortunately, we do not have a liberal market economy among the
countries in our analyses.3
In Germany, we expect both occupations and firms to play a strong
role in accounting for income inequality. The education system is or-
ganized around vocational training which funnels individuals into
particular occupations, sedimenting occupational distinctions cogni-
tively for individuals and into the broader cultural discourse. At the
same time, Germany’s apprenticeship system has polarized in recent
decades. As such, workers in higher status occupations often have ac-
cess to high quality apprenticeships and continued vocational training,
whereas low-skill workers struggle to find such opportunities (Thelen,
2014). It seems plausible that such trends will likely result in the in-
creased importance of occupations over time.
Germany is additionally marked by a set of industrial relations that
are strongly segmented along sectoral lines. Manufacturing sectors are
characterized by highly coordinated bargaining processes and strong
union power. Service industries, such as retail or telecommunications,
typically display weak or entirely absent labor unions and a much more
uncoordinated wage-setting process (Bechter, Brandl, & Meardi, 2011;
Doellgast, 2009). Such sectoral distinctions are likely to strengthen the
influence of firms on wage distributions.
We particularly expect the role of firms to grow over time in the
German case because of key trends in their system of industrial rela-
tions. Namely, the centrally coordinated wage-bargaining which would
suppress firm-driven wage inequality has steadily eroded over the last
twenty years as firms increasingly move towards local bargaining
processes (Card et al., 2013). As more firms opt out of the centrally-
coordinated bargaining process, between-firm wage variation is likely
to grow as some firms choose to adopt low-road strategies revolving
around cutting labor costs and other firms choose to invest more in
their workers. In recent work, Tomaskovic-Devey et al. (2019) have
shown that between-establishment inequality grew among 14 different
countries when bargaining decentralization has occurred.
Japan is quite another kind of coordinated market economy. Japan’s
economy is notably organized primarily through membership in parti-
cular firms. Skills learned through vocational training are not centered
around trades or occupations, but based around the particular needs of
the company (Thelen, 2014). In this case, rewards and other economic
benefits as well as one’s economic identity are described as flowing
from people’s relationship to firms regardless of the occupation one
holds within it. We thus expect occupations to be less important in
Japan compared to the other countries in this study. The firm compo-
nent, however, should be quite high.
Much like Japan, in South Korea firms shape a great deal of one’s
economic identity and material rewards. However, it also matters what
specific skills you bring to the firm and thus what tasks you can com-
plete. Thus, we expect that both firms and jobs will be particularly
influential in the Korean case.
Denmark and Finland are both emblematic of the Scandinavian
model often invoked in the political economy literature. Both countries
feature low total inequality and very high collective bargaining cov-
erage. The typical Scandinavian emphasis on egalitarianism and wage
solidarity means that occupations and firms are both likely to play less
important roles in income inequality compared to the other four
countries in this paper. On the firm side, both Denmark and Finland
display centrally-coordinated bargaining at the sectoral level, though in
both cases there is a non-trivial degree of firm-level bargaining as well
that has been growing since the 1990s (Dahl, Le Maire, & Munch, 2013;
Uusitalo & Vartiainen, 2009). In practice these firm-level bargains are
closely constrained by centralized mechanisms and associations, but
some have argued that a stronger presence of firm-level bargaining in
Denmark may lead to a larger firm component of inequality in Denmark
compared to Finland (Andersen, Dølvik, & Ibsen, 2014). Neither
country, however, possesses the dualized character of industrial rela-
tions found in countries like Germany or Japan. In Germany, industrial
relations are sharply divided between strongly coordinated/un-
coordinated and regulated/unregulated industries (e.g. manufacturing/
services) and in Japan the chief distinction is between large companies
and smaller enterprises. Scandinavian countries tend to be much more
sectorally homogenous, especially Finland (Bechter et al., 2011). Both
Denmark and Finland have been institutionally quite stable since at
least the mid-1990s, so we do not expect the relative importance of
either occupations or firms to change significantly.
4. Data and methods
A key reason for sociologists not directly comparing occupations to
organizations and jobs is that data containing all three components,
especially across an entire country, has in the past been rare. However,
as administrative data across countries have become more widely
available it is now possible in a range of national contexts to examine
the relative roles of occupations, establishments, and jobs in structuring
income inequality across whole economies.
4.1. Data structure
We use administrative data from Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Japan and South Korea, beginning in 1993 and continuing through
circa 2015. The structure of the data vary across these countries. For
Denmark the administrative data include all employees and all estab-
lishments in the national economy. Finland has both population and
sample data sources for our analyses. Finland’s population data have
measures of earnings but not wages, but Finland also has a survey of
firms that has good measures of wages. We use both data sources in our
analyses. For Germany we have samples of establishments. For estab-
lishments with less than 1,000 employees we have the full population of
employees but for larger firms we have a sample of up to 1,000 em-
ployees. For Japan and South Korea we have samples of both estab-
lishments and employees in those establishments, with higher sampling
frequencies in smaller organizations. The Japanese and South Korean
samples are limited to private sector employees, while the South Korean
sample is further limited to full-time employees.4 All estimates for all
countries, except Denmark and Finland, are produced with year specific
sampling weights.5 Appendix 1 gives more detail on country data
characteristics.
Compared to similar analyses based on labor force surveys our data
are of very high quality. All occupation and earnings data are reported
by the employer from personnel records and so are not subject to the
3 As far as we can tell no liberal market economy collects occupational data
from employers. It is possible in the U.S. to link occupational data from labor
force surveys to employer reported administrative data, though accessing these
data are cumbersome to say the least. In preliminary analyses on Israel, which
like the US is both a liberal market economy and permits such linkages, we
found that using sampled occupational information strongly reduces our ability
to observe establishment and job earnings variation and as a result severely
underestimates total wage variance.
4 We also have estimates for Korea for 1990 and 1992, but decided for
comparability with other countries to begin our analysis for Korea in 1993. Also
for Korea 2005 data are not available.
5 For Denmark we have population data so do not need to include sampling
weights. For Finland estimates including sampling weights do not substantially
alter the unweighted estimates.
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typical survey-based measurement error. Survey-based earnings esti-
mates have high levels of misreporting as well as inequality-muting
underestimates by high earners and overestimates by low earners (Kim
& Tamborini, 2014; Valet, Adriaans, & Liebig, 2019). Similarly, occu-
pational coding from surveys contain substantively large errors in both
reporting (Perales, 2014) and coding (Speer, 2016). Administrative
data describe the incumbent’s occupation from the point of view of
their employer’s personnel records and so are much less error prone.
This is not to say there are no sources of error in administrative
data. We pay particular attention to very low reported earnings, which
are most likely the result of very short job spells as well as occasional
recording errors. Employer reports of occupations are also prone to
errors in updating occupational codes in company personnel records
(see discussion in Tomaskovic-Devey, Hällsten, and Avent-Holt 2015).
No systematic comparison of errors in employer and employee reports
of occupations are available at this point, but we are confident that
survey self-report and coding errors are much higher than errors in
employer personnel records for both earnings and occupation.
All estimates come from very large samples of individuals, with the
exception of Denmark for which we have the full population and thus
no sampling error. The smallest sample is for South Korea in 2002, in
which we observe 364,124 individuals. This produces a 95 % con-
fidence interval around the occupational explained variances estimate
for that year (45 %) of 0.16 %. Sampling error is in all cases trivially
small and for this reason we do not report tests of statistical sig-
nificance, focusing instead on effect sizes.
4.2. Measurement
Our analyses focus on the decomposition of wage variances asso-
ciated with occupation, establishment, and jobs. Earnings is therefore
our core external criterion for examining the structure of stratification.
Our earnings measures include all earnings, including overtime and
bonuses, from the current job. If someone holds more than one job we
limit analyses to the highest paying job. There are some country-spe-
cific variations in the earnings concept and measurement, which are
outlined in Appendix 1.
With the exception of Germany, two earnings concepts were ex-
amined: logged total yearly earnings and logged hourly wages. For
Germany we lack a measure of hourly wages, but have a highly accurate
measure of daily earnings which we use instead of hourly wages. The
relative levels and trends in occupation, establishment, and job asso-
ciations with both wages and earnings were substantively equivalent
and so we focus on logged wages in all reported analyses. In addition to
being the most common earnings measure in both sociology and eco-
nomics, wages in all samples and country years were more strongly
associated with occupation, establishment, and jobs than were yearly
earnings, and our secondary analyses including individual covariates
also consistently displayed higher explained variance for wages than for
earnings.
We examined results for three employment definitions: all person-
employer records, only non-marginal records, and only full-time re-
cords. Full-time jobs were defined with country specific definitions of
hours worked or employment contract. For non-marginal employment
we dropped observations with very low earnings. Administrative re-
cords include all formal economy job spells, including those that lasted
only a few days or even hours, so these records tend to include some
very low earnings jobs for people with marginal labor force attachment.
The definition of marginal jobs varied across countries (see Appendix
1). Inequality and variance component levels and trends were sub-
stantively the same in all samples.
We focus on the non-marginal records, since this most closely re-
sembles those samples used in previous work in both sociology and
economics. This sample is probably closest to the survey based samples
in most prior research, which for sampling reasons would tend to miss
very short job spells, for measurement reasons would exclude unusually
low earners, and would include part-time as well as full-time workers.
Levels of explained variance for occupation tended to be highest for the
non-marginal samples as well.
In all countries occupation is measured using the national three
digit occupational codes. In Japan a single code, 999 office worker,
accounts for more than 40 % of all employment. We experimented with
three alternative operationalizations of occupation for Japan: the ori-
ginal code, dropping all 999 cases, and splitting office workers into
three education-occupation classes defined in terms of secondary, in-
termediate, or tertiary education at the individual level. Not surpris-
ingly, the latter coding increased explained variances, but only mar-
ginally. For Japan we use this expanded office worker/education
coding scheme.
The other noteworthy aspect of occupation is that the number of
occupations changes over time and varies between countries (see
Table 1). Germany begins with the fewest occupational distinctions
(92), but rises to 120 after 2010. Korea enters the data with 105, rises to
156 in 2000, but drops to 88 in 2005, and finally increases to 95 oc-
cupational codes in 2008. Japan begins with 124 occupations, rising to
137 in 2005. Finland begins with 126 in 1995, peaks at 131 in 2000,
but falls to 105 by 2016. Denmark begins with 132 in 1994, rises to 144
the next year, rises further to 149 in 2003, and increases again to 174 in
2010. Country and temporal variation in the number of occupational
codes reflects national accounting distinctions.
Establishments are defined as the physical location in which in-
dividuals work, and are measured with a workplace identifier.
Establishments are distinct from firms, representing a particular loca-
tion of work even if it is part of a broader legal firm.6 Following
Petersen and Morgan (1995) jobs are measured as the three digit oc-
cupation nested within establishment, also referred to as an occupation-
establishment pair.
To examine the sources of any residual wage variance beyond oc-
cupation, establishment, and job, we also estimate a series of models
that add individual age, sex, and education, variables typically
Table 1
Three Digit Occupation Counts for Years Observed.
Denmark Finland Germany Japan South Korea
1993 92 105
1994 132 92 106
1995 144 126 92 124 105
1996 144 123 92 124 106
1997 144 124 92 124 110
1998 144 128 92 124 106
1999 144 129 92 124 113
2000 144 131 92 124 163
2001 144 127 92 123 156
2002 144 122 92 122 152
2003 149 120 92 121 150
2004 148 121 92 122 150
2005 149 122 92 137 88
2006 149 127 92 137 88
2007 144 125 92 137 88
2008 148 127 92 137 95
2009 148 126 92 137 95
2010 174 119 92 137 95
2011 174 110 119 137 95
2012 174 110 119 137
2013 173 110 119 137
2014 172 109 119
2015 171 109 120
2016 105 120
2017 119
Note: Japanese occupation 999 (office worker) recoded into three educational
levels.
6 In Germany two establishments owned by the same firm in the same in-
dustry and locality are reported as one establishment.
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associated with earnings, to the respective occupation, establishment,
and job fixed effect models. Per the classic Mincerian wage equation,
age is measured as both age and its square. Education is converted to
indicator variables consistent with national educational distinctions,
making it a categorical measure of educational credentials. Sex is a
simple dichotomy between male and female. In general, we find that
sex and age tend to add explanatory power beyond occupation, estab-
lishment, and job. Education is always marginal in its impact, sorting
people into stratification positions but making little difference within
them.
There are, of course, many more establishments and jobs than there
are occupations. Thus, there is a certain mechanical tendency for these
finer grained observations to explain a higher proportion of the wage
variance than occupation alone. The core issue in our analysis then is
not simply explained variance, but what is the value added from
moving from an occupational to an organizational or job or individual
conceptualization of the stratification process. Since there is essentially
no measurement error in our dependent variable our focus on explained
variance and variance components is not vulnerable to the normal
problem of measurement error in reaching comparative inferences as to
model fit.
We report both estimates of adjusted explained variances (aR2) as
has been common in prior research in sociology (Grusky & Weeden,
2001; Mouw & Kalleberg, 2010; Weeden & Grusky, 2012; Williams,
2012) and variance components, the preferred approach in economics
(Barth et al., 2016; Card et al., 2013; Song et al., 2019). Explained
variance approaches are more sensitive to additional degrees of
freedom than variance component estimates, so we lean more heavily
on the variance component analysis for our direct comparison of oc-
cupations, establishments, and jobs (Vanneste, 2017). For our analysis
of individual increments to explained variance we work within the sum
of squares framework.
4.3. Analytical strategy
To assess the relative extent of occupational, establishment, and job-
level variance in wages we adopt a method from the literature on the
gender wage gap. Petersen and Morgan (1995) developed an analytical
method to assess how much of the gender wage gap is a function of
occupational, establishment, and job segregation between men and
women. They do this by first calculating the raw gender wage gap, and
then calculating the proportion of the gap that remains after accounting
for occupations, then separately after accounting for establishments,
and finally after accounting for occupation-establishment pairs, which
are conceptualized as jobs (for further uses of this method see Petersen,
Penner, & Høgsnes, 2010; Petersen, Penner, & Høgsnes, 2014; Smith-
Doerr, Tomaskovic-Devey, Alegria, Fealing, & Fitzpatrick, 2019;
Křížková, Penner, & Petersen, 2009). We do the same, although we
focus on total earnings variance, rather than the gender specific com-
ponent.
We start by estimating the total variance in (logged) earnings and
wages. We then introduce 3-digit occupational dummies to estimate
how much between occupation distinctions explain (the R2) and re-
duces (the variance component) the total variance in earnings. Here we
directly assess the claim in the occupational literature that income in-
equality is increasingly organized through occupations, as suggested by
the disaggregated structuralism of the micro-class approach (Grusky &
Weeden, 2001; Mouw & Kalleberg, 2010; Weeden & Grusky,
2012;Williams, 2012). This analysis also informs prior research that
asserts that occupational stratification structures are largely invariant
over time and place (Treiman, 1977).
We next asses the relative contribution of occupation, establish-
ment, and job to national wage variance. We first introduce establish-
ment dummies to estimate how much organizations explain and reduce
the total variance in earnings and then introduce jobs, measured via
occupation-establishment pairs, to estimate how much total wage
inequality is explained and reduced as a result of individuals working in
different jobs in the same workplace. In assessing relative contributions
we start by comparing the most recent year available, then examining
their overtime trends. In all cases our goal is to compare the three units
in terms of their explanatory power.
We then repeat this exercise in a hierarchical modeling framework,
first estimating the impact of occupation, establishment, and job, and
then estimating the additional impact of sex, age, age-squared, and
education on the residual within-unit earnings variance to assess the
marginal additional contribution of individual characteristics to ex-
plaining within unit residual wage variance.7 We compare individual
augmented wage models to the total explained variance associated with
job alone, as well as the degree to which within context residuals are a
function of observed individual traits.
If the long history of occupational analyses in sociology culminating
in the micro-class approach is correct and occupations are relatively
coherent and institutionalized socio-economic groupings, then we
would expect little additional variance to be explained by establishment
or job-level models and that occupation with the addition of individual-
level controls would explain comparable variance to jobs or establish-
ments alone. However, if jobs are a more reasonable socio-economic
grouping, as the workplace literature suggests, or if establishments are
more central to setting wages, as the recent research on between-
workplace wage polarization suggests, we would expect substantive
gains in explained variance with a focus at the establishment and job
levels. Moreover, the closer wage variance is to zero within occupation-
establishment pairs the more coherent jobs are as core stratification
locations.
5. Results
5.1. Occupations as micro-classes
Our first analysis investigates the degree to which occupations
should be thought of as coherent categories as argued in the micro-
classes literature, and temporally invariant as in the occupational
prestige literature. Fig. 1 reports the evolution of the occupational ad-
justed R2 and variance component over time for each country.
Across country-years occupations account for between 30 %
(Denmark and Germany in early years) and 56 % (Finland 2016) of
wage variance. In four countries the link between occupation and
wages has increased at least somewhat. In contrast, in South Korea the
occupational variance component peaked at 46 % in 2003, after which
it steadily decreased to 33 % in 2012. The sharpest increases happened
in Japan, with its variance component for occupation increasing from
roughly 35 % in the 1990s to a peak of 46 % in 2013.
Finland consistently has the strongest occupation-wage linkage
among these five countries, explaining between 42 and 56 % of wages
across the observation period. Germany and Denmark each have lower
and fairly stable relationships between occupations and wages.
Germany experiences an increase in the late 1990s, from just under 30
% in 1995 to a stable 34 % from roughly 2000 onward. Denmark, on the
other hand, hovers around 30 % from the beginning of the observation
period, but experiences a notable increase beginning in 2010 to peak at
35 % by 2013.
It is important to note that all countries display some instability in
the relationship between occupation and earnings. Finland is unusual
for its large drop in the early 2000s, but stability before and after.
Denmark, Germany, and Japan show secular trends towards stronger
7We do not have individual panel data for most countries and so there are no
doubt additional individual level sources of residual earnings variance that we
do not observe. Our point, however, is not to understand individual level
earnings dynamics, but to compare the explanatory utility of occupation, es-
tablishment, and job units.
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relations between occupation and earnings, similar to prior research on
the US and UK (e.g. Mouw & Kalleberg, 2010; Williams, 2012). South
Korea displays a marked decline in the association between occupation
and logged wages.
Country instability in occupational explained variance is to some
extent tied to changes in the occupational coding systems. For example,
in 2010 Denmark switches from 148 to 170 occupational codes and
explained variance rises. Similarly, in 2005 Japan moved from 123 to
137 codes and explained variance rises. Most dynamically, Korea has a
large jump in occupational categories between 1999 (n = 110) and
2000 (n = 163) and an even larger decline between 2004 (n = 150)
and 2005 (n = 88), followed by a rise in 2008 to 95. Korea is both the
most dynamic country in terms of its occupational accounting system
and explained variance. There is after 2005 a pattern of declining oc-
cupation-linked explained variance in Korea even within the smaller
occupational accounting system. Germany had a stable 92 codes until
2011, when it jumps to 120, although this appears to have had no
impact on explained variance.
5.2. Occupations, establishments, and jobs
We now focus on the relative variance explained by occupation,
employing establishment, and job. In Fig. 2 we compare the explained
variance and variance components associated with occupation, estab-
lishment, and job for the most recent year in each country for which we
have estimates. Countries are arrayed from lowest to highest occupa-
tion-linked explained variance. In all analyses the variance component
is higher than the R2, so we focus in the following on variance com-
ponents. Patterns are always substantively equivalent between the two
measures.
In every country, except Finland, establishment is a better predictor
of wages than is occupation. In Finland the occupational variance
component is about 20 % higher than the establishment component. In
all of the other countries the establishment component is larger than the
occupational component, ranging from 13 % higher in Denmark to 59
% higher in South Korea. Germany is closer to Denmark in this regard
(24 % larger establishment component), while in Japan the establish-
ment component is 33 % larger than the occupational variance com-
ponent.
Treating occupation as a more fundamental stratification context
than workplace is, at least for four of these five countries, a mistake.
Only in Finland is occupational context consistently more influential on
wages than workplace in terms of its explanatory power. We also ob-
serve occupational effects in Denmark that are marginally larger than
establishment effects in the initial observation year, although estab-
lishment becomes increasingly stronger than occupation over time.
Only in Finland does occupation explain more than 50 % of wages. In
contrast, in Germany, South Korea, and Japan establishment explains
more than 50 % of wages.
In all countries jobs are more influential stratification contexts than
either establishment or occupation. The job component is impressively
high by any standard, from a low of 67 % in Germany, followed by
Denmark (70 %), South Korea (72 %), and at the high end Finland and
Japan (78 and 79 %, respectively).
The general pattern is that the vast majority of wage variance is
associated with jobs everywhere. That jobs are more influential than
occupation or establishment alone is not surprising from a statistical
point of view. Substantively, however, the strong explanatory power of
occupations in a specific workplace context also supports an inter-
pretation of stratification processes, at least for wages, as lodged at the
intersection of skill and status hierarchies (occupation), organizational
resources (establishment), and local relations of production (job).
Fig. 1. Trends in three digit occupational adjusted explained variance and variance components for logged wages; non-marginal person-employer matches, circa
1993–2015.
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We next compare all countries in terms of the trends in their relative
levels of inequality and in their occupation, establishment, and job
variance components. Fig. 3 tracks changes in total wage variance (top
panel) and the occupation, establishment, and job variance components
(bottom panel).
Wage inequality in Denmark appears remarkably stable, while in
both Germany and South Korea total inequality rises rapidly until 2010
and then drops. Finland displays declining inequality until the mid-
2000s, while Japan first increases and then drops after 2010. In all
countries, except Finland, the great recession is associated with an in-
equality dip, either small (Denmark) or large (Germany, Japan, South
Korea).
Turning to the variance components, prior to 2010 the establish-
ment variance component rises in all countries. This is consistent with
the recent research on the rising importance of between-workplace
inequality in many countries reviewed earlier. Perhaps as a result of the
Great Recession, after 2010 this trend appears to have reversed in
Germany and South Korea, while stalling in Japan. Denmark and
Finland, on the other hand, continue apace with a secular increase in
the establishment variance component. The job level variance compo-
nents, on the other hand, are more stable over time, rising in Finland
and Japan, rising and then falling in South Korea, and remaining re-
latively stable with local fluctuations in Denmark and Germany.
5.3. Comparing occupation, establishment, and job to individual traits
Weeden et al. (2007) speculate that within occupational wage var-
iance is primarily a function of individual characteristics. The previous
analysis suggests that this is not the case, but that workplace and job
locations are important structural sources of wage variation in their
own rights. At the same time it seems useful to investigate whether
within these structural locations individual characteristics explain
additional variation in wage rates. In the absence of linked employer-
employee data many analysts will only have information on occupation
in addition to individual characteristics. These individual character-
istics can be thought of as sorting people between the unobserved es-
tablishments and jobs in such data, or generating career workplace and
job inequalities within occupations. We examine these possibilities in
two stages.
First, we compare the explained variation associated with occupa-
tions and establishment in models that also contain individual educa-
tion, sex, age and age squared with that associated with jobs alone,
allowing us to estimate the degree to which adding individual covari-
ates to occupation and establishment fixed effects approximates the
explanatory power of job context alone. In other words, this allows us
to see the degree to which sorting into jobs can be proxied with in-
dividual level observables. We focus on age, sex, and education since
they are the ones most commonly available in surveys of individuals,
and we model this for the first and last year of observation in each
country.
We can see this comparison by comparing column 1 in Table 2 to
columns 2 and 3, respectively. In general adding education, age, and
sex to occupation and establishment models closes the gap with a jobs
only model, but does so much more effectively for establishment than it
does for occupation. Only in Germany toward the end of the time series
does an occupation model with further individual controls approach the
explained variance associated with job information alone. In contrast,
in all country years an establishment model, supplemented with in-
dividual characteristics, produces explained variance quite similar to a
jobs only model. In Japan early in the observation period and Germany
late in the observation period the establishment plus individual traits
model actually predicts more wage variance than the jobs model alone.
In our second stage we compare the addition of individual traits to
explained variance for occupations, establishments, and jobs. This
Fig. 2. Explained Variance and Variance Components for Logged Wages and Stratification Context, Primary Job, All Non-Marginal Person-Employer Matches,
circa.2013–2017.
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allows us to examine the Weeden et al. (2007) assumption that in-
dividual traits explain remaining variance beyond occupation. We can
observe this by comparing columns 2–4 in Table 2. In all cases, with the
exception of Finland, the establishment model with individual covari-
ates is superior to the occupation model with individual covariates. In
Finland the occupational and establishment models with individual
covariates explain almost the same amount of variance in wages.
In all country years the jobs model with individual covariates is
substantially superior to the other two. In addition, in all country-years
the addition of individual covariates substantively increases total ex-
plained variance relative to a job fixed effect model only, increasing
explained variance from a low of 5.3 percentage points in Japan in the
last year observed to a high of 15.4 percentage points in Germany also
in the last year observed. In all cases, except Denmark in the first year
observed, jobs capture at least three-fifths of the explained variance,
and in most country-years roughly two-thirds or more of the variance.
At the same time, the value-added of individual covariates varies sub-
stantially across countries. Treating within-occupation variance in
wages as socially unstructured individual variation is not a reasonable
assumption as much of within occupation variance is associated with
the workplace context of employment.
6. Discussion
Our task in this paper is to assess the value of an occupation-cen-
tered study of social stratification relative to a sociology that in-
corporates the stratification dimensions of job and establishment. Our
punchline is that jobs and establishments figure prominently in the
social organization of wages, and must be included in theoretical
models and whenever possible in empirical analyses of social stratifi-
cation. Stratification is not a story about occupations untethered from
their workplace contexts. While occupations do form an independent
basis of stratification, they provide a weaker input into the stratification
process than do either workplaces or jobs.
We provide three distinctive analyses to empirically assess the re-
lative contributions of occupations, organizations, and jobs to earnings
inequalities across five countries. First, we assessed the power of oc-
cupations in explaining wage variance. This cross-national assessment
of occupations found substantial variation across countries in both the
Fig. 3. Total logged wage variance and variance components associated with occupation, establishment and job, non-marginal person-employer matches, circa
1993–2015.
Table 2
Comparison of Job Only Fixed Effect Explained Variance to Occupation,
Establishment and Job Models that Include Individual Level Predictors, Primary




Adding Individual Age, Age2, Sex, Education to Context
Fixed Effect
Occupation Establishment Job
Denmark 53.6 % 46.4 % 52.1 % 63.1 %
Finland 64.6 % 59.0 % 57.0 % 71.3 %
Germany 66.6 % 44.1 % 64.2 % 74.1 %
Japan 67.8 % 53.5 % 73.0 % 79.6 %
S. Korea 75.2 % 63.2 % 77.8 % 86.1 %
Last Year Observed
Denmark 60.0 % 49.4 % 53.3 % 66.8 %
Finland 69.7 % 61.0 % 59.8 % 76.9 %
Germany 61.0 % 58.4 % 69.4 % 76.4 %
Japan 74.7 % 55.3 % 71.1 % 80.0 %
S. Korea 67.9 % 47.9 % 67.8 % 78.5 %
Note: Japanese occupation 999 (office worker) recoded into three educational
levels. South Korea and Japan, Private Sector Only. South Korea full-time only.
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levels and trends in the occupation-wage linkage. Finland has the
strongest occupation-wages link and is the only country where occu-
pation alone explained more than 50 % of the variation in wages across
individuals. This is followed by Japan at 44 %, with all other countries
hovering in the mid-30 % range of explained variance. The trends are
also not uniform. Japan experienced a growth in the occupation-wage
link after 2004, while Demark and Germany experienced increases in
the occupation-wage link in the late 2000s and mid-1990s, respectively.
And South Korea experienced a steep decline in the effect of occupation
on wages after 2004.
Thus, occupation varies in its impact on wages over time and across
countries. There is also no simple cross-country temporal pattern of
increased or decreased institutionalization of occupational distinctions.
While it does seem to be the case that changes in occupational coding
schemes are associated with changes in explained variance, even this
pattern is not universal.
Although Denmark and Finland share many institutional simila-
rities, occupations seem to play substantially different roles. Finland
had the strongest occupation-wage linkage of any of the countries ex-
amined, whereas Denmark fell in the middle of the pack. Inconsistently
with our institutional expectations, it is in Japan where occupation, at
least in the early 1990s through the late 2000s, has consistently the
second highest explanatory power. To the extent that there is a clear
pattern across countries, occupation tends to explain 30–35 % of the
variance in logged wages in Europe, Japan (in the early years) and
South Korea (more recently).
This finding has important implications for the literature on occu-
pations and wages. In general, the literature suggests a secular increase
in the link between occupations and wages in the post-1980s world.
However, this is based almost exclusively on data from the US and UK
(e.g. Mouw & Kalleberg, 2010; Williams, 2012). When we bring in more
countries this story is less universal, suggesting a cross-national em-
pirical agenda in occupational sociology is necessary theoretically ra-
ther than simply an added bonus when data are available.
Our second analysis directly compared the relative value of the
three bases of stratification: occupations, establishments, and jobs.
Occupation appears in most cases to be the weakest stratification con-
text. In four of five countries establishments explain more variance than
do occupations, with Finland as the exception. Moreover, in South
Korea and Japan establishments alone explain more than 50 % of the
variance in wages in the last year observed. Even more telling, prior to
2010 all countries experienced an increase in the establishment-wage
linkage. Perhaps the great recession reduced this effect in Germany,
South Korea, and Japan, but these trends speak to the importance of
cross-national research in studying the sources of wage inequality.
More importantly bringing establishments into the analysis of wages
identifies jobs as the fundamental unit of economic stratification. It is
not just what skills and general tasks one performs (e.g. occupation)
that matters, but where and with whom we work as well.
In our final analysis we focus on the importance of individual
traits. While individual traits matter in all countries, their explained
variance beyond sorting is never anywhere near the impact of simply
identifying the occupation, the establishment, or the occupation-es-
tablishment pair in which one works. Individual traits add somewhere
between a few percentage points to about 15 percentage points to a
job fixed effect. This is not trivial, but when a job accounts for roughly
three-fifths to two-thirds of wage variance in most contexts this sug-
gests position matters much more to earnings variance than do in-
dividual traits.
The addition of individual traits to the establishment only model
produces explanatory power more nearly equivalent to a jobs only
model, but less so with the addition of individual traits to an occupation
only model. Occupational information without establishment context is
consistently a weaker explanatory context than job. In four countries
knowing establishment and individual traits produces explained var-
iance almost as high as knowing people’s jobs.
7. Conclusions
Our findings present a critical challenge for sociologists studying
occupations, and especially the occupation-wage link. It is not sufficient
to analyze occupations and be done with it. Occupations matter, but
must be located in their specific establishment contexts in order to
adequately observe their stratification consequences. That is, what you
do matters, but where you do it and the conditions under which you do
it provides critical information as well. This leads us to organizations
and jobs as fundamental units of analysis for stratification. In contrast
to occupations, earnings are more closely tied to organizations than to
occupations, and jobs as the nexus of occupations and organizations
provide a stably high predictor of earnings.
We organized this paper with a set of weak expectations about the
role of national political economic institutions in generating levels and
trends in occupational, establishment, and job-level variance in wages.
The most consistent result emanating from these expectations is that
countries with sharply dualized industrial relations systems (namely,
Germany, Japan, and South Korea) tend to have high establishment
components of wage inequality, and this component has grown as these
countries have experienced further dualization, declining union density,
and decentralization of wage bargaining. Even among the more secto-
rally homogenous Nordic countries, Denmark possesses both more de-
centralized wage bargaining and a higher establishment component of
wage inequality than Finland. While this paper both provides some
evidence for the institutional expectations we derived from prior litera-
ture and rejects the lack of institutional expectations in the occupational
stratification tradition, we think that we are a long way from having a
reasonable handle on the role of national institutions in workplace wage
setting. Clearly they are important, but how they work at the organiza-
tional level is not so clear. More work is then needed to link organiza-
tions to political economic institutions (e.g. Avent-Holt, 2019).
The analyses presented here suggest an even more urgent need to
focus our research agenda on the role of establishments in generating
stratification. If one had to choose between occupation and workplace to
index stratified social locations, in four of the five countries we examine
here, workplace would be the better choice. In addition, there is also
much existing evidence that inequalities between workplaces are rising,
not only in the countries examined here, but in many others as well (Song
et al., 2019; Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2019). This suggests that empiri-
cally occupation will become a weaker basis for distribution over time.
Even more so, to the extent that the growth in between-establish-
ment inequality is driven by the polarization of workplaces by skill
distinctions, the distinction between workplaces and occupations be-
comes irrelevant in practice. We do not have the space to fully articu-
late what an establishment-centered research agenda for stratification
should look like (for direction see Avent-Holt & Tomaskovic-Devey,
2019; Stainback et al., 2010; Tomaskovic-Devey & Avent-Holt, 2019).
But, it must be one that takes seriously both the role of what happens in
organizations and the relations between organizations in configuring
labor market institutions and outcomes.
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Appendix 1 Country Specific Data Sources and Measurement
Denmark. The data consists of population-level observations of both private and public sector workplaces. All industries are included. The
analytic sample includes all employed individual’s primary jobs as registered in November. Estimates are based on both annual and hourly earnings.
Because Denmark does not have a national minimum wage, the bottom 5 % of jobs were considered marginal jobs. The full-time job variable is
defined by the registrar as any job that exceeds 26 hours a week. This information stems in part from unemployment insurance records and in part
from the mandatory ATP pension records which contain categorical information on hours worked. This variable relates to the job held by a worker
late November each year. The occupational codes DISCO are a national adaptation of the International Standard Classification of Occupations.
Revisions roughly follow revised ISCO releases.
Data were purchased from Statistics Denmark. The core of the data is the Register-based Labor Market Statistic RAS and the Integrated Database
for Labor Market Research IDAN, which identifies workers and establishments consistently over time including annual and hourly earnings as well as
the occupation of the workers. We have access to information about individual characteristics for the full population of workers for 1994–2015
including level of education from the education registers.
The quality of earnings records improves marginally after 2008 when the earnings are drawn from the so-called e-income register which contains
even more rigorous earnings accounts than the previously used tax records. This shift does not appear to substantially impact total earnings variance
or earnings component estimates.
Finland. We have employed two data sources. Analyses of yearly earnings were generated using the workforce registry-based Finnish
Longitudinal Employer-Employee data (FLEED). These are administrative data with complete coverage of all jobs and industries. The FLEED does
not, however, collect data on hours worked. Once a year in October-November hours worked information is collected from employers for a large
fraction of the labor forces for Finish Structure of Earnings Statistics (FSES). All analyses reported in the text utilize (FSES), where both wages, hours
or work, and full-time status are measured with precision.
FSES includes all public sector employees and private sector coverage (depending on the year and industry) ranges from 55 to 75 % of all private
sector employment during the last quarter of the year, though the vast majority of small firms are excluded. Agriculture, forestry and fisheries,
employers and their households, international organizations, as well as job spells that both begin and end during the reference month are excluded.
In the FLEED yearly earnings are available as are the number of months employed. Earnings is measured as total earnings from all sources divided
by months employed. Marginal jobs are defined as the bottom 10 % of the income distribution. To approximate fulltime wages, the monthly earnings
of full-time workers in the Structure of Earnings Data were analyzed and the fifth percentile identified. All individuals in the FLEED data, whose
monthly earnings were below the fifth percentile (as identified among full-time workers in the SES data) were excluded.
In the FSES there is precise information on monthly earnings and hours worked. Hourly wage is calculated by dividing monthly earnings by
actual hours worked. In the FSES marginal jobs are defined as hourly wages below the first percentile. Following Statistics Finland, individuals,
whose regular working hours are more than 90 % of the potential maximum as stipulated by the Working Hours Act or in the appropriate collective
agreement, are considered full-time employees.
Both FLEED and SES entail information on firm and establishment number, but establishment ID missingness is high in SES. Therefore, in-
formation on establishments is based on the FLEED data for both data sources. Since wage information in the SES is collected in Oct-Dec, and the firm
and establishment number in the FLEED is collected in December, by construction we are assuming that employees do not switch employers across
these three months. To test this assumption we compared estimates yielded by the firm number in FLEED and firm number in SES (which has
substantially less missingness) and found almost identical results.
Germany. Data come from a customized sample for the project “Dynamics of organizational earnings inequality: Investigation within the
Comparative Organizational Inequality International Network (COIN)” of the Integrated Employment Biographies Sample (IEBS) combining records
of the employment history (BeH) and benefit recipient history (LeH) of the Federal Employment Agency was used. The customized sample of the
IEBS was drawn in 2017 and roughly covers 5 % of the German employed population and 20,000 establishments over the time. The data spans from
1990 to 2015. East Germany is included from 1992 onwards in the data. The East German data reaches the West German quality level in 1993. In
very large workplaces, a sample of 1,000 workers were collected while in smaller workplaces we have the full population of employees. The data
provide information on private and public-sector establishments from all industries.
The basis for the data is the integrated notification procedure for health, pension and unemployment insurance, which came into effect as of 1
January 1973 and was extended to cover Eastern Germany on 1 January 1991. Under this procedure employers are required to submit notifications
to the responsible social security agencies concerning all their employees covered by social security at least once a year. Thus, the data includes only
workers liable to social security contributions (civil servants [Beamte] and self-employed are excluded), which covers around 80 % of the entire
workforce.
These data represent a sample of firms and their employees. In the first step 20,000 randomly selected establishments in all years of their
existence and their employees were chosen. The basis for the first step of the selection were all establishments, which existed in Germany between
1993 and 2013 independently from the duration of their existence or their region. The establishments were drawn proportionally to their size.
Smaller establishments are selected with a decreasing probability. For reasons of data protection, we limit the maximum of the sampling probability
to 0.3, as otherwise, due to the skewness of the workplace size distribution, large workplaces would be drawn nearly completely into the sample.
Based on this selection, in the second step, employees of the selected 20,000 establishments were selected. For large establishments the number of
employees was limited to 1,000 randomly selected employees. Once an individual was selected into the sample all available information on the
individual between 1990 and 2015 was provided even if the employee was working only for a limited period in the previously selected estab-
lishments. This allows us to calculate not only establishment-level but also individual fixed-effects.
The customized sample of the Integrated Employment Biographies Sample (IEBS) are episode data, i.e. each observation has a start date and an
end date. The data is transformed from spell into panel data to estimate the models. For the estimations employees are nested within the selected
establishments in every year of the establishment existence and for every employee there is only one job per year.
Yearly earnings associated with each job is the observed earnings concept. We do not have hourly wage, but have a precise measure of days
worked and so our wage concept is daily wage. Marginal jobs were defined as those which reported less than 450 euros per month. Persons employed
in such jobs (e.g. newspaper delivering) are not obligated to pay social security, which are currently at less than €450 per month, are excluded from
the sample. They were automatically excluded from the sample until 1999 and are removed afterwards by excluding wages €2 above the threshold
after. Full-time jobs are defined by the employer based on employment contract.
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Because the German Earnings data are top-coded, an imputation strategy based on Card et al., (2013) was used to impute top daily earnings. The
method uses a tobit model that incorporates individual and workplace-specific components in the prediction equation. Estimates are weighted to
produce national estimates. However, rather than focusing on the mean individual and workplace wage prior to the censored observation as was
done by Card and his coauthors we utilize information on lagged waged. We reason that the censored wage is more strongly influenced by the most
recent period than by mean wages over longer periods. Using lagged information, the wage distribution is smoother than that created by a replication
of Card’s imputation model, which seem to have too few jobs immediately to the right of the censoring limit and also too few cases in the far tails of
the distribution. Appendix 2 provides the rationale and code used.
Japan. Estimates are generated from the Basic Survey on Wage Structure conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare of Japan. The
survey is a two-stage design in which a sample of private sector establishments with at least five employees are selected, and then a uniform random
sampling of workers among these establishments is taken. Full-time work is defined in the survey as those working “general hours.” In the survey,
part-time workers are defined to be workers whose daily hours worked is shorter than that of full-time workers or whose working days per week is
less than those of full-time workers. Person-job matches that report monthly earnings less than half of the minimum wage are excluded. This
eliminates less than .01% of all person-job matches.
South Korea. Estimates are from the Wage Structure Survey conducted annually by the Korean Ministry of Labor. The data consist of a sample of
private sector establishments, first stratified by size and then by region and industry. An establishment must have had a minimum of five employees
to be included in the sample before 1999, and 10 employees beginning in 1999. All industries except Agriculture are included. The dataset contains
only full-time employees, defined by employers as employees with a fixed-term employment contract longer than twelve months or those with a
permanent (open-ended) contract.
The Survey provides information on a worker’s monthly base pay, monthly overtime pay, and annual bonus, as well as information on monthly
hours of work and hours of overtime work. Based on the information, we calculated hourly wage by dividing monthly base pay by regular work
hours. Additionally, monthly earnings were calculated by adding monthly base pay, monthly overtime pay, and a one-month amount of bonus (i.e.,
annual bonus divided by 12).
Marginal jobs are defined as those that pay hourly wages smaller than one-half of the wage at the 10th percentile of total workers included in the
Survey each year.
Appendix 2 Imputation strategy for top coded income
In the German social security records wages are censored at the social contribution limit which differs by year and in East and West Germany. The
wage information stated in the social security notification is sum of wages related to the employment episode. The daily wage is the episode wage
divided by number of calendar days, i.e. it is the average wage for this period. Wages are deflated by the CPI, base year is 2010. We consider all daily
wages as censored that are larger than the contribution limit minus 3 € in order to account for rounding errors.
1. Imputation methods
1.1. Simple
A simple approach to top-coding is to use individual information only to impute missing earnings for top coded cases. Tobit regressions by year,
East/West Germany, gender, education and age groups. This is the most common approach in the literature that developed out of top coded survey
data. Since much wage variation is associated with employment organization this is not a satisfying approach for linked employer-employee panel
(LEEP) data.
1.2. Card/Heining/Kline
Card et al. (2013) include in their imputation equations using German LEEP data the leave-one-out mean workplace and mean individual wage
and workplace shares of censored observations in their imputation equations to improve top-code estimates. In our replication of their imputation
model we discovered that their method produces too few jobs immediately to the right of the censoring limit and too few cases in the far tails of the
distribution.
1.3. The lagged wage alternative
Rather than focusing on the mean individual and workplace wage prior to the observation year we utilize information on lagged wages in our
prediction equation. When the lagged wage is missing it is imputed in an earlier stage. We reason that the censored wage is more strongly influenced
by the most recent wage than by mean wages over longer periods.
1.3.1. Individual Stratification. Individual variables are used in the imputation models to stratify the sample. These include the cross-classification of
gender, education, age groups and East and West German residence. Each imputation equation is estimated separately for each cell of this cross-
classification.
1.3.2. Firm variables. Each imputation is based on a prediction equation that contains lagged individual daily earnings plus a series of organizational
characteristics.
We include the following workplace level variables in the imputation equations: fraction of workers with university degree, mean years of
schooling of firm by gender, log firm size, fulltime employees, log firm size squared, dummy for firm size>10 full-time employees, mean log real
daily wage of co-workers, fraction of co-workers with censored wage, dummy firm has only 1 worker in current year.
1.4. Stata Code for Imputation Procedure
Since censored wages are likely to be censored in prior years we utilize an iterative imputation strategy.
Step 1: independent imputation models by year, age (4 categories) education (five categories), sex and east/west Germany
= + …logw x t* [1994 2010]it it it





Step 2: include lagged variables in order to account for correlation over time
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type = {org, ind, lag, mean}
If person in sample in t-1 org = observed uncensored wage
ind = imputed wage from regression in t-1 without lag variables
lag = imputed wage from regression in t-1 with lag variables
If person is not in sample in t-1 logwit 1 is replaced by the person mean estimated:












i.e. current wage – average change












i.e. average change →close to 0
If person is not in sample in t-2 logwit 1 is replaced by mean
























i.e. average change →close to 0
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